Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, upon coming to power in Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution, adopted a distinctly Shia-sectarian constitution. With its approval, all Iranian citizens who did not belong to the Shia sect became, in practice, second-class citizens. At the same time, he embraced the export of the revolution beyond Iran through his “tilling the land” programme. To this day, the peoples of the region continue to suffer from the consequences of this programme. Among its bitter outcomes was the creation of ideologically driven Shia militias, which have caused significant bloodshed in several Arab countries.

Today, the Iranian regime is increasingly exposed amid the ongoing war with the United States-Israel alliance. What it had long concealed about its intentions towards the Arab Gulf states and the excess power it possesses has now been revealed. It has failed to respect the rights of neighbouring countries, targeting civilian sites and economic infrastructure in Gulf cities.

Gulf-Iranian relations are among the most complex issues in the regional system of the Middle East. The image of Iran in Gulf political, media, and intellectual discourse has been shaped by this ideological and military legacy, whose foundations were laid by Imam Khomeini and later translated into realities on the ground by Ali Khamenei. These relations have been defined by repeated military and security confrontations, as well as political positions viewed by Gulf Cooperation Council states as a direct threat to their security and sovereignty. Official and media discourse in the Gulf tends to portray Iran as a regional actor seeking to expand its political and military influence at the expense of neighbouring states and their peoples.

Imam Khomeini left Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with three directives: killing Saddam Hussein, producing an atomic bomb, and occupying Mecca and Medina. These directives have deepened the crisis within the system of Guardianship of the Jurist. While Iran ultimately saw the execution of Hussein, its continued pursuit of the other two directives has placed it in a regional and international dilemma. Iran’s programme of exporting the revolution and establishing armed Shia militias in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen over the past four decades, while funding and directing them, has brought it into direct conflict with regional countries, especially the Gulf states. Likewise, its pursuit of a nuclear programme has placed it in sustained confrontation with the international community.

Iran’s regional network of armed groups reflects this strategy clearly. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is not merely a party but a “super-state” that takes its orders from beyond its borders; in Yemen, the Houthis are not a Yemeni national project but a tool to export Iranian national security to the borders of Saudi Arabia and threaten navigation in the Red Sea; in Iraq, Iran has established Shia militias to which the state itself defers; and in Arab Ahvaz, demographic change and the destruction of Arab palm trees are carried out in the name of Persian national security.

The project introduced by Khomeini is not an Islamic project, even if it employs Islam to serve it. It is a new imperial project, driven by Persian ambitions, using religion as both cover and driving force. Khamenei is considered the true heir to the 1979 revolution and the continuation of this ideological project in all its dimensions.

Khomeini developed the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, which did not exist in Shia doctrine before he came to power. Under this theory, Ali Khamenei, and after him Mojtaba Khamenei, acts as the “Guardian Jurist” on behalf of the hidden imam and receives directives from him directly. The Guardian Jurist is not merely a religious concept but a political, security, and military authority, leading an axis of followers across the region and pursuing a project of dominance at both regional and international levels. The “scorched earth” approach is one manifestation of this imam-centred project.

The supreme leader is also a religious authority within the Shia sect, surrounded by an aura of sanctity among Twelver Shia believers. The assassination of Ali Khamenei would therefore mean the loss of a central pillar of the Wilayat al-Faqih system.

Ali Khamenei oversaw Iran’s nuclear programme, missile capabilities, space programme, and regional influence, including figures such as Qassem Soleimani. The killing of Khamenei would close a major chapter of revolutionary logic in Iran and push the state towards a retaliatory path. Iran has already sought to prepare for this by accelerating allegiance to his son Mojtaba, although he does not possess his father’s charisma or influence. Iran before Khamenei will not be the same as Iran after him.

Iran’s dilemma in war

Western media coverage has portrayed Iran as a central actor in regional instability, focusing on its military capabilities, support for armed groups, and nuclear and missile programmes. These narratives have reinforced the image of Iran as a destabilising force and contributed to a climate in which the current war between the US-Israel alliance and Iran is accepted by Western public opinion.

The 2019 attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia marked a turning point in Gulf discourse on Iran. Gulf leaders viewed them as a direct threat to regional and global energy security. These events reinforced perceptions of an Iranian threat and pushed Gulf states to strengthen military and security cooperation with regional and international partners.

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important strategic maritime passages, with about 20 percent of global oil trade passing through it. It is the main artery for exporting oil and gas from the Gulf to global markets, particularly Asia. If Iran were to close the strait or disrupt navigation, exports would be halted, global prices would rise sharply, and major economic disruption would follow, including inflation, financial instability, and slower growth. Food supply chains in Gulf countries would also be affected.

Such a move would provide internationally acceptable justification for the US to form a military coalition to protect navigation, potentially including the occupation of Iran’s Kharg Island. Gulf states would also be compelled to expand security cooperation and strengthen maritime defence capabilities.

Iran faces a complex military dilemma. It does not possess a modern air force capable of sustaining a prolonged conventional war against the US or Israel. Instead, it relies on ballistic missiles, drones, and asymmetric warfare, which serve as tools of deterrence rather than decisive victory. It also depends on proxy warfare through groups such as Hezbollah and militias in Iraq.

The Houthis remain a key escalation factor. Their entry into the war would depend on a decision by the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to which they are subordinate. If the US were to forcefully reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis could attempt to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait as a final escalation step.

Iran avoids direct war because its infrastructure is vulnerable to precision strikes, its nuclear facilities are exposed, and its economy cannot withstand prolonged conflict. It therefore follows a strategy of escalation without direct war, relying on indirect pressure through its regional network, while the US-Israel alliance seeks to draw it into confrontation.

Iran’s dilemma in peace

Politically, Iran faces a degree of international isolation under Western sanctions. Its allies, Russia and China, do not want to engage in direct war with the West on its behalf. Despite some improvement in relations with Gulf states following the 2023 Beijing agreement with Saudi Arabia, Gulf states continue to rely on the US for security.

Internally, Iran faces recurring protests, a legitimacy crisis, divisions between reformists and hardliners, and opposition from secular and independent currents. Economic sanctions have led to inflation, currency depreciation, and reduced investment. Iran operates a war economy with limited capacity, relying on unofficial oil sales and discounted exports, particularly to China.

At the same time, Iran seeks to achieve rapid deterrence through missiles, drones, and its regional proxies, while signalling nuclear capability. This increases the likelihood of preemptive strikes and exposes it to multiple fronts.

Iran is therefore caught in three dilemmas: strong deterrence but weak war-fighting capability; wide regional influence but limited economic resources; and an escalation strategy that risks turning into a full-scale war it seeks to avoid. It pursues sustained pressure below the threshold of war, seeking to exhaust its adversaries without entering direct confrontation.

For Iran, victory in this confrontation means the survival of the Islamic republic. It considers US military bases in the region legitimate targets, arguing that it cannot strike the US directly. This has extended to the targeting of Gulf economic infrastructure, embassies, and hotels, on the grounds that they host a US or Israeli presence. This has created a clear gap between what the political leadership declares and what the IRGC carries out in practice.

The Gulf at a crossroads

The Arab Gulf states now stand at a crossroads. In response to Iranian missiles and drones targeting civilian and economic sites, they have strengthened their air defence capabilities through systems such as Patriot and THAAD, intercepting many of these attacks before they reach their targets. They have also expanded security partnerships with countries such as Pakistan and Turkiye.

However, Gulf states do not seek an open war. If escalation continues and crosses critical thresholds, they may be forced to move beyond defence towards preventive military action to neutralise threats before they reach their cities.

If Iran retains sufficient capability, it may attempt to target or even occupy Gulf territories and islands, leading to a dangerous escalation with unpredictable consequences. The region would then face a conflict with consequences that cannot be controlled.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

As the United States–Israel war against Iran enters its third week and continues to spill across the region, the question is no longer who will win but how this conflict might end. Each round of retaliation deepens a cycle that threatens to pull the wider Middle East into prolonged instability. Yet even the most entrenched wars eventually give way to negotiation. The challenge is recognising the moment when continuing the fight becomes more costly than stepping back.

Earlier this week, Iran once again denied responsibility for recent attacks on civilian infrastructure in the Gulf and proposed forming a joint committee with regional states to investigate the incidents. Tehran suggested that a cooperative mechanism involving Gulf countries could clarify what happened and determine responsibility. Whether such a proposal is sincere or simply tactical is another matter. Iran has repeatedly insisted that its war is with the US and Israel, not with its Gulf neighbours. But continued missile and drone attacks across the region have heightened suspicion. Any Iranian claim will be scrutinised carefully, if not outright rejected.

Still, Gulf states understand better than most that this war is not in their interest. It is not a conflict of their choosing, and they have been careful not to become direct participants so far. Their response has largely been limited to condemning Iran’s “indiscriminate and reckless strikes targeting sovereign territory and endangering civilian populations”, while focusing on defensive measures such as air defence operations. That restraint is not accidental. Gulf leaders know that a direct confrontation with Iran – a country of more than 90 million people with substantial military capabilities – could quickly spiral into a long and destructive regional war. The memory of the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s still looms large across the Gulf, a reminder of how quickly such conflicts can drag on for years and reshape the region.

There is also a deeper anxiety at play. Gulf capitals see little clarity in Washington about what the endgame of this war might be. At the same time, they are acutely aware that the conflict reflects the strategic priorities of Israel’s leadership under Benjamin Netanyahu. The concern in many Gulf capitals is that, if the war widens, they may be left carrying much of the burden. From their perspective, escalation could leave them exposed while others move on to different theatres. Indeed, Israel has already begun shifting attention towards Lebanon, long a central front in its military planning. The unresolved challenge of Hezbollah and longstanding ambitions to occupy the area south of the Litani River continue to shape its strategy.

Against this backdrop, while Iran “sees no reason to negotiate with the US”, its proposal for a joint investigative mechanism still offers a narrow but meaningful opening for regional de-escalation. Gulf states may decide that cautiously exploring dialogue with Tehran, even if only at a technical level, could help prevent further destabilisation in their immediate neighbourhood. Their willingness to consider such engagement may also reflect the complex intelligence landscape that has emerged in the region. Since October 7, 2023, there has been growing recognition of the extraordinary reach of Israel’s intelligence services and their ability to operate across borders, including inside Iran itself. Israel’s decision to strike the South Pars gasfield (the world’s largest gas reserve, jointly shared between Iran and Qatar) on March 18, despite its clear regional and global economic significance, underscores the extent to which it may be willing to act in ways that risk drawing Gulf states more directly into the conflict. In such an environment, determining responsibility for attacks is rarely straightforward. A joint or independent investigation could therefore serve as a practical first step towards de-escalation.

This war is unlikely to produce a decisive military victory. Nor is it likely to evolve into a comprehensive peace process any time soon. The most realistic objective in the near term is a ceasefire.

Historically, ceasefires emerge when all sides reach the same conclusion: that continuing the war will cost more than ending it. But for a ceasefire to hold, each side must also be able to claim some measure of success. In practice, that means crafting an outcome that allows all parties to save face at home while quietly stepping back from escalation.

The most plausible path forward begins with phased de-escalation rather than a sweeping political agreement. In practical terms, an initial phase could focus on halting attacks on Gulf states and civilian infrastructure, alongside clear assurances that Gulf territory will not be used as a launch platform for strikes on Iran. For such an arrangement to work, Gulf governments would need to insist that the United States refrain from using its regional bases to launch further attacks on Iranian territory. At the same time, Iran would need to halt attacks on maritime shipping and energy infrastructure. Securing the Strait of Hormuz would create strong incentives for international actors, from Europe to Asia, to support and, where possible, enforce a ceasefire.

A second phase could then focus on ending the direct exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel. At that stage, political narratives will matter almost as much as the military realities. For Israel and the United States, leaders will likely argue that their operations succeeded in degrading Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities and imposing significant strategic costs. They may also frame the decision to halt escalation as a deliberate choice aimed at sparing civilian lives. Presented in this way, stopping the campaign would not appear as a retreat but rather as the successful completion of a limited military objective.

Iran, meanwhile, would frame the outcome very differently. Tehran would emphasise resilience, arguing that the Islamic republic survived intense military pressure and that attempts to destabilise the regime failed. Iranian leaders would likely claim that their response to the assassination of their supreme leader and the imposed war restored deterrence and forced their adversaries to reconsider the risks of further confrontation.

These narratives may clash, but they are not unusual in war. Many wars end in precisely this way: not with a clear victor, but with an arrangement that allows each side to claim it achieved its core goals.

Direct negotiations between Iran and its primary adversaries remain politically fraught and difficult to sustain. In such circumstances, and given the recent history of misuse of negotiations hosted in the region, progress will require the involvement of a major external power capable of exerting influence on multiple sides at once. China appears well positioned to play such a role. Beijing has cultivated strong economic and diplomatic relationships across the Middle East, maintaining working ties with Iran, the Gulf states and Israel alike. Its growing political weight, combined with its interest in protecting the stability of global energy markets, gives it both the incentive and the leverage to encourage de-escalation.

China has already demonstrated its ability to mediate regional disputes. In March 2023, Beijing brokered a landmark agreement that restored diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran after a seven-year rupture, leading to the reopening of embassies and the resumption of formal ties. High-level engagement between Washington and Beijing as part of preparations for President Donald Trump’s scheduled trip to China, recently delayed until late April due to the Iran war, could create a rare opportunity for quiet great-power coordination aimed at preventing a wider regional war. Despite their strategic rivalry, both powers share a clear interest in avoiding a conflict that could destabilise global markets, disrupt energy supplies and deepen geopolitical uncertainty.

Regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, would still play an important supporting role in encouraging China to become involved. Countries such as Oman and Qatar have long served as discreet conduits for dialogue, capable of hosting back-channel discussions and maintaining communication when formal negotiations stall. European governments and international institutions could complement these efforts by coordinating economic incentives or sanctions relief as part of a broader diplomatic package.

The most difficult challenge will be addressing the security concerns on all sides. Iran has long demanded that security in the Gulf be managed by regional states themselves. Israel and its partners, in turn, insist on credible guarantees that Iranian military capabilities will not threaten their security. Bridging this divide will require sustained, careful diplomacy and patience.

What is certain is that this war will not end through maximalist demands or decisive battlefield triumphs. It will end when leaders recognise that prolonging the conflict serves no one’s long-term interests.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.