It is not true that the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei necessarily means the immediate collapse of the regime.

This is a hasty reading, reflecting more wishful thinking than sober analysis. Yes, we are witnessing a seismic blow, the most dangerous to hit the Islamic Republic since its establishment in 1979. But the more important political question is no: “is the blow bad?” but rather: “was the system built in a way that allows it to absorb a blow of this magnitude?”

The available evidence so far indicates that the system was designed from the outset not to be merely the shadow of a single man, no matter how elevated his position.

The Islamic Republic is not an autocratic regime like in the familiar Arab context, where the entire structure collapses when its head disappears. It is a complex ideological and securitised system, with a religious head, beneath whom there is a network of solid institutions—some constitutional, some security-related, some bureaucratic and economic—all working to preserve the entity itself, not merely to serve the individual.

For this reason, the killing of the supreme leader does not automatically erase the state, nor topple the regime simply by virtue of the event; rather, it shifts the crisis from the question of “the survival of the head” to the question of “internal cohesion”. The struggle to maintain it is where the real danger lies.

The Iranian constitution itself was drafted with the spectre of a power vacuum in mind. Article 111 stipulates that a temporary council assumes the powers of leadership when the position becomes vacant, until the Assembly of Experts chooses a new leader as soon as possible.

After the announcement of the Leader’s killing, powers were transferred temporarily to a three-man council comprising President Masoud Pezeshkian, the head of the judiciary Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, and Guardian Council member Alireza Arafi.

Meanwhile, the choice of the new supreme leader was in the hands of the Assembly of Experts, which is made up of 88 members.

We can describe this clarity in how to deal with the vacancy of the Leader’s position as a “survival protocol” designed to give the system the capacity to continue even at a moment of maximum shock.

But the bigger mistake would be to be deceived by the constitutional form alone. Yes, the text matters, but the balance of power matters more. Here we must distinguish between three layers from which the system draws its strength.

The first layer is religious legitimacy, represented by the office of the Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts, and the Guardian Council. This layer grants the system its doctrinal legitimacy and determines who holds the “seal of legitimacy”. Therefore, the battle over succession is not merely administrative but theological and political at the same time.

The second layer is the security-military sector, headed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is in fact the backbone of the system, not just one of its institutions.

The third layer is the political bureaucracy, meaning the government, the presidency, the judiciary, and the administrative and economic apparatuses that keep the state’s daily functions running and prevent a scene of general collapse.

Among all these layers, the truly decisive one is the IRGC.

Recent reports indicate that, after Khamenei’s killing, the main question is no longer: “Is there a constitutional mechanism?” but rather: “Will the IRGC remain cohesive?” This is because this body is not subordinate to the president, nor is it a conventional army. It is the actual guardian of the revolution, possessing the upper hand in internal security, in regional decision-making, and in economic and influence networks.

Because of the war and the killing of senior commanders, the IRGC has tightened its grip on decision-making in the country, and has come to rely on a degree of operational decentralisation that allows mid-level leadership to continue working quickly.

This means that the blow may have struck the head, but it has not paralysed the limbs.

Based on current indications, it is difficult to assert that the Iranian regime will fall as a result of this war alone. Some signs in fact point to the opposite: ideological regimes, when faced with an external existential threat, may harden rather than collapse, and the targeting of the supreme leader may in the short-term lead to greater hard-line stances and defensive cohesion, not rapid disintegration.

Even some elements of the Iranian opposition abroad have said explicitly that bombing alone does not topple the regime, and that any real change, if it happens, requires an internal dynamic broader than mere military strikes.

However, the absence of immediate collapse does not mean safety. The regime may not fall, but it could emerge from this war exhausted, wary, and more closed in on itself—especially after the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei, the late supreme leader’s son. This, in my view, is the most likely scenario so far: the regime remains, but in a harsher, less self-confident form.

War tests not only deterrent capacity, but also reveals the extent of internal frailty and reshapes centres of power. When a regime emerges from such a war bloodied by losses and with its very head under threat, it tends to choose the security option: it turns inward, expands suspicion, narrows the political sphere, and treats opponents and dissidents as “potential breaches” in the wall of survival.

This tendency has already begun to appear. Reports has spoken of internal fissures that surfaced under the pressure of war—between hardliners close to the IRGC and a relatively less hardline current associated with President Pezeshkian’s positions, especially after the controversy following his remarks about halting attacks on Gulf states.

Some hardline clerics within the system pushed for expediting the choice of a new supreme leader, suggesting unease with having actual power temporarily distributed among a three-man council in the midst of an open war. These are not yet signs of collapse, but they are signs of anxiety within the structure itself.

The dilemma, then, is not the absence of a mechanism, but the environment in which this mechanism is being tested: war, assassination, external pressure, military losses, divisions within the elite, and fear of defection.

In sum, the Iranian regime, up to this moment, does not appear headed for a rapid fall, but it also does not seem capable of emerging from this war unscathed, as it was before. The most likely outcome is that it will endure, but at a high price: greater reliance on the IRGC, less space for politics, heightened sensitivity toward opposition, and a stronger inclination toward internal security contraction.

To put it more plainly: this war may not end the regime, but it may end what remains of its flexibility. When regimes lose flexibility, they may prolong their life by force, but at the same time they begin a slow internal drain. That is the current Iranian paradox: a regime that has not fallen, but is entering a new phase of anxious rigidity—rigidity that may protect it today, and weaken it tomorrow.

The Arabic version of this article was first published by Al Jazeera Arabic.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance. 

As the economic fallout of the United States and Israel’s war with Iran reverberates across the globe, the economies of the Gulf are suffering some of the worst damage.

Iran has launched continuous attacks on Gulf states since the onset of the conflict on February 28, arguing that it is attacking military bases used by the US for the war. Gulf nations have rejected Tehran’s claims, insisting that that attacks on them are unjustified.

These Iranian strikes have upended energy production and inflicted major disruption to tourism and travel, putting the region at risk of some of the most severe economic harm since the 1990-91 Gulf War.

“Disruptions to aviation, tourism, shipping routes, and energy exports – combined with higher insurance premiums and freight costs – mean the region is likely losing hundreds of millions of dollars per day in economic activity,” said Khaled AlMezaini, an associate professor of politics and international relations at Zayed University in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates.

“The exact scale will depend largely on how long disruptions to trade routes, ports, and airspace continue.”

After more than two weeks of war, the economic impact on the region has already been substantial.

Middle Eastern oil producers’ daily output declined from 21 million barrels to 14 million barrels after a little more than a week of conflict, amid the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, according to Rystad Energy.

Output is expected to drop substantially further if commercial shipping continues to avoid the strait amid Tehran’s threats, with Rystad Energy predicting a decline to 6 million daily barrels in a worst-case scenario.

While US President Donald Trump has said “numerous” countries stand ready to help Washington secure the waterway with their navies, no government has yet confirmed its involvement, while several have ruled out deploying warships for the effort.

Despite significant economic diversification in recent decades, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman – still rely on oil production for nearly one-quarter of gross domestic product (GDP).

Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain are especially exposed to the disruption due to their limited access to export routes that bypass the strait, said Yesar Al-Maleki, a Gulf analyst at the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES).

“Saudi Arabia and the UAE are somewhat better positioned because both have invested in infrastructure that allows them to partially bypass the strait,” Al-Maleki added, pointing to Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline and the UAE’s pipeline to Fujairah, which can transport roughly 5 million barrels and 1.8 million barrels per day, respectively.

Goldman Sachs has estimated that Qatar and Kuwait could see GDP plunge 14 percent if the war lasts until the end of April, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia facing contractions of 5 percent and 3 percent, respectively.

At the same time, however, S&P Global Ratings, a leading ratings agency, has affirmed a “stable outlook” for Qatar, adding that the country’s “large financial buffers should enable sufficient fiscal and external space to offset the impacts of adverse geopolitical developments, including temporary disruptions to the production and export of LNG”.

Meanwhile, Capital Economics has suggested that GDPs in the region could fall 10-15 percent if the conflict lasts at least three months and causes lasting damage to energy infrastructure.

Iraq, which borders the Gulf but is not a member of the GCC, has also been hit hard by the energy crisis.

Peter Martin, head of economics at Wood Mackenzie, said the Iraqi government has been losing some $3bn in daily revenues based on an estimated 70 percent decline in output.

“The duration of production constraint is key to the economic impact, but highly uncertain,” Martin said.

“Assuming Iraq were to suffer a 10 percent year-on-year decline in oil production in 2026, we estimate that GDP could contract by 3.5 percent this year.”

While energy remains the economic lifeblood of the Gulf, the war has spilled over into other critical sectors, particularly tourism and travel, a growing sector that accounts for about 11 percent of the GCC’s GDP.

Airspace closures and restrictions led to 37,000 flight cancellations between February 28 and March 8 alone, according to aviation analytics firm Cirium.

On Tuesday, UAE authorities briefly instituted a total closure of the country’s airspace, citing “rapidly evolving regional security developments”.

The announcement came a day after Dubai International Airport, normally the world’s busiest international gateway, was forced to suspend flights after a drone attack on a nearby fuel depot. Qatar Airways, meanwhile, has slowly started special flights, ramping up their frequency — though none of the Gulf carriers has reached pre-war levels of aviation traffic.

In an analysis published last week, the World Travel & Tourism Council estimated that the conflict was costing the region $600m in daily spending by international visitors.

“The fact that for now over a fortnight most tourist bookings, conferences, sporting events etc have had to be cancelled will concretely represent massive costs to the region’s travel sectors and hotels and hospitality sectors,” said Emilie Rutledge, an economics lecturer at The Open University in the UK.

“How many tens of thousands of Europeans and Asians would have come through Doha, Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the past 15 days had it not been for America and Israel’s war on Iran?” Rutledge said.

Al-Maleki, the analyst at MEES, said the economic fallout could be comparable to historic regional crises if the war drags on.

“In the near term, the scale of disruption may resemble the economic shock experienced during the pandemic, while a sustained closure could approach the magnitude of the economic fallout seen during the 1991 Gulf War,” he said.

AlMezaini at Zayed University said he sees a Gulf-wide recession as still being unlikely, pointing to the extensive fiscal reserves that many countries can turn to to withstand short-term shocks.

While the risk of a downturn will rise if the war goes on for weeks, “the more likely base case is weaker growth and a delayed recovery rather than a broad, deep contraction – especially for larger economies such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia,” AlMezaini said.

“If tensions de-escalate relatively quickly, the region is well placed for activity to normalise faster than many expect,” he said.

The Israeli military has claimed in a post on X Tuesday that it has killed the commander of the Basij unit, the internal security paramilitary militia of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

“Guided by precise intelligence from Military Intelligence, the Air Force conducted a targeted strike yesterday in the heart of Tehran, eliminating Gholam Reza Soleimani, commander of the Basij unit over the past six years,” it said on Tuesday.

Iran has not confirmed this claim.

If confirmed, Soleimani would be the highest level assassination in the war since United States-Israeli strikes killed the former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and several members of his family on the first day of the war they launched on February 28.

More to come…