The UK government is splashing out £45 million (c $60 million) on a new AI-driven supercomputer designed to help scientists model the chaotic physics of nuclear fusion, with the system expected to come online this summer at the UK Atomic Energy Authority’s (UKAEA) Culham campus.

The machine, called Sunrise, is being pitched as the world’s most powerful AI supercomputer that is dedicated specifically to fusion energy research. Funded by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), the 1.4MW system is slated to begin operating in June and will form the first major piece of infrastructure in what ministers describe as the UK’s planned “AI Growth Zone” at Culham in Oxfordshire.

Fusion research has long relied on large-scale simulations to understand the behavior of superheated plasma and the extreme materials in experimental reactors. The idea behind Sunrise is to combine high-performance computing with physics-informed AI models, allowing researchers to run more detailed simulations and develop digital twins of complex fusion systems before attempting costly physical experiments.

According to the government, the system will deliver up to 6.76 exaFLOPS of AI-accelerated modeling performance. That figure refers to AI workloads rather than the traditional supercomputing benchmarks used in global rankings, but it still represents a significant increase in modeling capability for the UK’s fusion research programs.

The machine will incoporate AMD EPYC processors and AMD Instinct GPU accelerators running on Dell PowerEdge infrastructure, with WEKA providing the storage platform. Intel is also supporting the project, alongside the University of Cambridge and the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA).

Officials say the system will help tackle several key challenges in fusion research, including modeling plasma turbulence, developing reactor materials, and advancing tritium fuel breeding technologies needed for future fusion systems.

Dr Rob Akers, director of computing programs at the UKAEA, said the system is intended to bring an “Apollo program” style approach to fusion development by allowing researchers to test and refine designs in a virtual environment before building them in the real world.

“Sunrise will bring that capability to fusion by combining high-fidelity simulation with physics-informed AI to develop predictive digital twins that reduce the cost, risk, and time of learning that would otherwise require expensive and time-consuming physical testing,” he said.

The supercomputer will support several UK fusion initiatives, including the LIBRTI program, which focuses on tritium fuel-cycle technologies, and the government’s flagship STEP project, a prototype spherical tokamak power plant that Britain hopes to build in Nottinghamshire in the 2040s.

Sunrise also fits into a broader push by the UK government to expand its domestic AI and supercomputing capacity. Earlier this year, ministers confirmed a separate £36 million (c $48 million) investment in the Cambridge supercomputing center, while Culham is expected to become a hub for AI-driven scientific computing tied to energy research.

Whether AI can meaningfully speed up the notoriously slow march toward commercial fusion power remains an open question. For now, the UK is betting that more computing power might help crack one of physics’ most stubborn problems a little faster. ®

The recently released executive order targeting cybercrime, fraud, and predatory schemes uses language the federal government has often avoided. Now, for the first time, the Trump administration is echoing what the cybersecurity industry has been shouting for years: cyber-enabled fraud is a product of transnational organized crime.

That distinction matters because organized crime requires an organized response.

Cybercrime is now the world’s fastest-growing criminal economy, built on stealing from everyday people. It is no longer a loose collection of hoodie-wearing hackers in basements or misfits trading malware in online forums. It is a mature global industry operating at scale. In the entirety of human history, there has not been a transfer of wealth of this magnitude since the era of pillaging empires. We have just gotten so used to it that it feels like background noise.

Modern cybercrime groups look less like street gangs and more like corporations. They run structured operations, complete with HR departments, training pipelines, performance metrics, and technology stacks that rival most enterprise companies. Their attackers don’t rely on sophisticated exploits — they think like expert investigators, systematically probing for weaknesses, exploiting psychological pressure, manipulating insiders, and using deception to move through gaps that defenders left open. They operate around the clock, in every time zone, and increasingly use AI to automate attacks at a scale that once required highly skilled operators.

Worse yet is that many of these operations rely on forced labor. Scam compounds in Southeast Asia run like factory floors, with rows of trafficked workers carrying out romance scams, cryptocurrency fraud, and impersonation schemes under threat of violence.

Their goal is to make fraud faster and more profitable. The result is a global criminal ecosystem that extends far beyond online scams. It fuels human trafficking, weapons smuggling, political corruption, compromised organ systems, and even nuclear programs.

If the federal government is ready to recognize what the industry has known — that cybercrime truly operates like an organized global industry — then responding to it solely through traditional law enforcement is not enough. The question goes beyond how governments apply sanctions, coordinate investigations, or pressure jurisdictions that harbor these operations. The greater question is whether the private sector is willing to help dismantle the infrastructure that allows this industry to thrive.

One word changes everything

I want to be specific about why this executive order is different, because the language is not accidental.

The order doesn’t just call these groups “hackers” or “organized crime.” It calls them transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). That word carries legal and operational weight that most coverage has glossed over. Transnational is the jurisdictional framing that authorizes an entirely different class of response. It is the same threshold that moves a case from local law enforcement to federal jurisdiction and beyond.

Pair that with what follows – “law enforcement, diplomacy, and potential offensive actions” – and you are reading something that goes well beyond a policy memo. Notice the sequence: diplomacy before offensive action is proportionality doctrine. But the administration did not rule out offensive action. The document also calls for deploying the “full suite of U.S. government defensive and offensive cyber operations” and uses the word “shape” as its first pillar of action. In military doctrine, shaping an adversary’s behavior does not mean gentle persuasion. It means force is part of the calculus.

This is not the language of a consumer protection policy. Whoever wrote this has studied the opposition.

An organized threat demands an organized response

The executive order draws a line in the sand: cybercrime has outgrown its origins as a consumer protection issue. It’s now a fundamental threat to economic stability and national security. But tackling an industry operating at this scale requires more than government action alone. The order’s answer is to mobilize the private sector – giving companies the green light to identify and disrupt adversary networks.

That framing matters.

The private sector sees the machinery of cybercrime every day. Security vendors, major platforms, and infrastructure providers spot the command-and-control servers, malicious domains, and payment pipelines that keep these operations moving. Too often, that intelligence is used only to defend commercial interests, when in reality, it should also be used to disrupt the networks behind the attacks. When criminal groups lose core infrastructure, they have to rebuild. That costs time. That costs money. That creates pressure.

At the same time, the order puts a question squarely before the private sector: How far is it willing to go, and under what terms? I spent my career believing “minimal force” matters. Precise, proportionate action prevents escalation and avoids creating cascading problems. As we move beyond a defense-only approach, those principles matter more than ever.

There is another question that sits underneath all of this: How far does “potential offensive actions” actually go? Does it stop at cyberspace? Financial sanctions? Asked bluntly, “Will leaders and shareholders know whether providing threat intelligence ends with a measured network take-down or an all-out drone strike on the fraudulent call center?”

Organizations need to fix the security weaknesses criminals are exploiting for profit. Most attacks in 2026 do not succeed because criminals are brilliant. They succeed because the basics are missing. No multifactor authentication. Weak Identity controls. Unpatched vulnerabilities sit open for months. Criminals don’t care about your industry or company size. They go where it’s easiest.

When organizations ignore basic security controls, they are doing more than accepting risk. They’re subsidizing the criminal infrastructure that exploits those gaps.

Governments must keep pressure on nations that harbor these operations. Large-scale cybercrime thrives where enforcement is weak or non-existent. The order specifically calls out “nations that tolerate predatory activity”—a signal that safe havens won’t be ignored. Stronger coordination across governments, law enforcement, and private industry can make it much harder for criminals to operate at scale.

The order also targets “foreign TCOs and associated networks,” with “associated networks” being a deliberately broad phrase. Defining who qualifies will be critical. Draw the lines too narrowly and the policy won’t work. Too broadly and you risk dangerous escalation.

Simply put, cybercriminal groups are disciplined because discipline pays. Disrupting them will require the same. It will demand pressure on countries that act as safe havens. It will take dismantling the infrastructure behind these schemes. It will require better basic security across every organization that criminals target.

The executive order is right – Cybercrime is organized. It is industrial. It is ruthless. For the first time in a long time, the response looks like it might be, too. Whether the government, private sector, and public can align around what this actually demands, and what it risks, are still unanswered questions.

After years of watching policy documents gather dust while victim numbers grow, I will take action over perfection every time.

Kyle Hanslovan is a former NSA cyberwarfare operator and CEO of Huntress Labs.