In a move which has shifted the US-Israel war on Iran up a gear, Israel struck Iran’s critical South Pars gasfield on Wednesday. Soon after, Iran hit energy facilities across the Gulf region, including a gas facility at Qatar’s Ras Laffan plant early on Thursday.

It is the latest escalation in a war that began on February 28 when the United States and Israel bombed Iran, killing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other senior officials in Tehran. Iran has responded by targeting Israel, but has also struck many of its Gulf neighbours.

Here is what happened at South Pars and Ras Laffan, and why it is so significant.

What happened at South Pars and Ras Laffan?

On Wednesday, Iranian state media reported that natural gas facilities associated with the South Pars field had been attacked.

Following this, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatened to attack oil and gas infrastructure in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, a move that would further seriously disrupt the region’s energy infrastructure, which has already been fractured by the war, now in its 20th day.

Hours later, Iranian missiles struck a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility at Ras Laffan Industrial City in northern Qatar. Doha reported that the attack caused three fires.

Qatar’s Ministry of Interior said a fire at the site had been preliminarily brought under control and that no injuries were reported.

How has Qatar responded to Iranian strikes on energy facilities?

Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on Wednesday: “The State of Qatar expresses its strong condemnation and denunciation of the blatant Iranian attack targeting Ras Laffan Industrial City, which caused fires resulting in significant damage to the facility.”

“All personnel have been accounted for and no casualties have been reported at this time,” QatarEnergy, the world’s largest LNG producer, said.

In another statement early on Thursday, QatarEnergy reported that several other LNG facilities had also been struck, “causing sizeable fires and extensive further damage”.

In response, Qatar expelled several Iranian military and diplomatic personnel from the country, declaring them persona non grata and ordering them to leave within 24 hours.

What has the US said about these strikes?

President Donald Trump wrote in a Truth Social post that neither the US nor Qatar had any involvement in or prior knowledge of Israel’s initial strike on the South Pars field.

“Iran did not know this, or any of the pertinent facts pertaining to the South Pars attack, and unjustifiably and unfairly attacked a portion of Qatar’s LNG Gas facility,” Trump wrote.

He also guaranteed that Israel would not attack the South Pars field again unless “Iran unwisely decides to attack a very innocent, in this case, Qatar”.

Trump added that, in this case, the US “with or without the help or consent of Israel, will massively blow up the entirety of the South Pars Gas Field at an amount of strength and power that Iran has never seen or witnessed before”.

How have other affected nations responded?

Following a meeting on Wednesday of top diplomats from several Arab and Muslim countries in Riyadh, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud told the media on Thursday that the Gulf states’ tolerance of Iran’s attacks on their territory would be limited.

He warned that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have “very significant capacities and capabilities” that could be drawn on should they “choose to do so”.

“The patience that is being exhibited is not unlimited. Do they [the Iranians] have a day, two, a week? I’m not going to telegraph that,” Prince Faisal added.

How significant is the South Pars natural gasfield?

South Pars is part of the world’s largest natural gasfield, which spans 9,700sq km (3,745sq miles), and is shared by Iran and Qatar. It is located near the Iranian coastal city of Asaluyeh.

About one-third of this field is Iranian, called South Pars, while the Qatari side of it is called the North Field.

The attack on South Pars is unlikely to affect international energy supplies a great deal, as Iran uses most of the gas extracted from the field domestically.

Iran is the fourth-largest consumer of LNG in the world after the US, Russia and China, according to the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. It relies heavily on natural gas for heating homes and generating electricity.

South Pars is Iran’s biggest source of domestic gas supply, providing 80 percent of the country’s natural gas needs.

South Pars does export some gas to Iraq. Overall, Iran supplies roughly one‑third of Iraq’s gas and power needs, according to Iraq’s Ministry of Electricity.

On Wednesday, the Iraqi News Agency (INA) quoted Electricity Ministry spokesperson Ahmad Moussa as saying that Iranian gas supplies to the country had been halted due to recent regional developments, sharply curbing power production.

How significant is Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility?

The Ras Laffan complex, located 80km (50 miles) northeast of the Qatari capital, Doha, is the world’s largest LNG production facility, producing about 20 percent of the world’s LNG supply and playing a major role in balancing Asian and European markets’ demand for the fuel.

At the start of March, just days into the war, Qatar suspended LNG production following an attack close to the Ras Laffan facility as well as on a water tank at a power plant in Mesaieed Industrial City.

Rachel Ziemba, a senior fellow at the think tank Center for a New American Security, said the fact that Ras Laffan had already paused production meant there would be no immediate new global supply shock in the near term as a result of the latest strikes.

“But it could put further pressure on regional power supplies,” Ziemba told Al Jazeera. She added that it also “risks prices staying high for longer”.

Tom Marzec-Manser, director of gas and LNG at the United Kingdom-based analytics firm Wood Mackenzie, told Al Jazeera that because of the extensive damage to Ras Laffan on Wednesday, even when the Iran conflict ends and if the Strait of Hormuz reopens, Qatari LNG production will not fully resume within a few weeks as previously expected.

“It could easily take months for nameplate capacity to return, and there will also be an impact on the timeline of the new projects at North Field East and South.”

Babak Hafezi, professor of international business at American University, said rising LNG prices would affect European markets which have become increasingly reliant on LNG  “since the start of the Ukrainian war and the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines”.

Other significant economies reliant on LNG include Japan, Turkiye and India.

“Smaller countries with weaker economies in the Global South will be hurt the most, as LNG price increases will lead to demand destruction,” Hafezi told Al Jazeera.

Which other sites were targeted by Iran since Wednesday?

Saudi Arabia said it intercepted and destroyed four ballistic missiles launched towards Riyadh on Wednesday, as well as an attempted drone attack on a gas facility in its east. On Thursday, Iran again targeted Riyadh.

Meanwhile, operations ⁠were ⁠suspended at the Habshan ⁠gas facility in the western region of Abu Dhabi, as UAE authorities responded to ⁠two incidents of falling debris after the successful interception of a ‌missile, the Abu Dhabi Media Office said. It added that the Bab oilfield, south of Abu Dhabi, had also been targeted.

What impact have the latest strikes had on energy prices and stocks?

Following the series of attacks, LNG wholesale prices in Europe jumped to their highest level in more than three years.

The price of gas at the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) in the Netherlands, Europe’s main gas trading hub, had risen by 13.36 euros ($15.33) to 68.03 euros ($78.06) per megawatt hour by 09:07 GMT on Thursday.

The price of crude oil also soared further, with Brent crude – the global benchmark – reaching $115 a barrel, exacerbating an already looming energy crisis due to the war. Brent crude was trading at about $65 a barrel before the war began.

Oil prices initially surged when, on March 2, Ebrahim Jabari, a senior adviser to the commander-in-chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), announced that the Strait of Hormuz – through which 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas is transported – was “closed”.

The football federation of Morocco says it welcomes the CAF Appeal Board decision to award it the 2025 AFCON title.

The Royal Moroccan Football Federation (FRMF) has commended the decision to award its country the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) title, which was stripped from Senegal.

The FRMF “welcomes the decision, which reaffirms the primacy of competition regulations and reinforces the conditions necessary for the proper conduct of international tournaments”, the federation said in a statement on Thursday.

The Confederation of African Football (CAF) had announced on Tuesday that its Appeal Board had awarded the tournament to Morocco, the defeated finalists, on January 18.

The final, which Senegal won 1-0 in extra time, was delayed for 14 minutes when the Senegalese players and staff returned to the dressing room in protest against the awarding of an injury-time penalty to Morocco in the second half.

When play eventually resumed, Moroccan striker Brahim Diaz missed the kick with Senegal going on to win the game thanks to Pape Gueye’s stunning strike.

“From the outset, following the incidents that led to the interruption of the match, the FRMF maintained a clear and consistent position: the strict application of the governing regulations. The Federation’s approach was solely guided by this principle,” the FRMF statement read.

“Following its appeal, CAF has now confirmed that the applicable regulations were not properly enforced.”

Morocco appealed to CAF to overturn the result immediately after the final, which descended into chaos during and after the protest, and led to a pitch invasion, which resulted in 18 Senegalese fans being handed prison sentences.

The initial appeal was rejected, and the Appeal Board decision came exactly two months after the final was completed.

“Throughout the process, the FRMF acted in full compliance with all relevant legal and procedural frameworks, with a constant focus on upholding its rights and preserving the integrity of the competition,” it said in the statement.

“This decision provides clarity on the applicable framework and strengthens the consistency and credibility of international competitions, particularly within African football.”

The Senegal Football Federation (FSF) immediately responded to CAF’s ruling by saying it would take its own appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport.

Such a process could take as long as a year to reach a final decision.

Senegal’s government on Wednesday went on to allege corruption following the decision and called for an independent international investigation into the matter.

February 28, 2026, will be remembered as the day the law of the jungle returned. On that fateful day, the United States and Israel, in flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, launched Operation Epic Fury, “raining death and destruction” on Iran.

Although it was not the first time that the US and its Israeli ally had used negotiations to lull an enemy into a false sense of security before attacking, the US-Israeli assault nonetheless caught Iran off guard. Several high-ranking Iranian officials were killed in the strikes, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Yet the attacks failed to achieve the regime change the US and Israel had anticipated. The Iranian government, bruised and bloodied but undefeated, endured.

In response, Iran attacked US military installations and diplomatic missions in the Middle East and Israel with drones and missiles. While the retaliation inflicted some damage, it fell short of deterring further attacks in the face of the other side’s overwhelming military superiority. On the contrary, US strikes intensified, culminating in the largest yet on March 10. With Iranian missile stockpiles and launchers falling dangerously low, it has become apparent that without outside intervention, Iran is fighting what could be its last stand.

China’s muted response

With Russia preoccupied with its own war, Iran waited to see whether its only other ally capable of going toe to toe with the US, China, would come to its aid. The answer came quickly. Two days into the war, during a regular news conference at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, business continued as normal, as if the US and Israel had not just attacked one of China’s comprehensive strategic partners. When it became clear that China would remain silent, an Iranian journalist protested. Only then did the ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, reluctantly condemn the US-Israeli assault.

In the days that followed, China became a vocal critic of the attacks. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued, “Might does not make right,” warning that the attacks proved that “the world has regressed to the law of the jungle.” Yet for all his strong words, Wang stopped short of explicitly naming the US or Israel as the aggressor, even if there was little doubt which countries he meant. Furthermore, China offered Iran little substantive assistance beyond rhetoric.

While China contacted several Middle Eastern countries and sent a special envoy on a diplomatic tour of the region, a move that helped prevent Iran’s neighbours, many caught in the crossfire, from joining the fray, it made no attempt to directly confront the US, the country ultimately responsible for the war, let alone send Iran military aid.

China’s response remained muted even when Iran, in a bid to provoke international intervention, closed the Strait of Hormuz, a vital maritime corridor through which 40 percent of China’s imported oil passes each day. Faced with a direct threat to its economic lifeline, Beijing’s only response was to call for all parties to cease hostilities and return to the negotiating table. Its priorities were clear.

That priority, of course, is Taiwan.

Iran is not as important

One month before the US-Israeli attacks, during the largest US military build-up in the Middle East since its 2003 invasion of Iraq, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump held a phone call. In the US readout, the conversation covered a range of topics, including rising US-Iranian tensions.

In the Chinese version, however, the focus was on China-US relations and Taiwan while rising US-Iranian tensions were omitted. Xi reiterated that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, stressed its importance to China and China-US relations, and drew a red line at its independence. Xi also warned Trump that the US must proceed with utmost caution regarding planned arms sales to Taiwan.

In response, according to Beijing, Trump stated that he attaches great importance to China’s concerns regarding Taiwan and promised to uphold sound and stable China-US relations.

Silence on Iran on China’s part speaks volumes. It reinforces the idea that, despite Iran’s membership in Chinese-led initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, it is not as important to China as previously assumed. Crucially, it suggests that a deal securing China’s core interests has been struck and Beijing was unwilling to jeopardise those gains for a distant ally.

Indeed, facing domestic setbacks and eager to secure a trade deal with China, the US’s third-largest trading partner, to boost his approval ratings, Trump conceded to Xi’s requests in the days after their call and delayed a multibillion-dollar arms sale to Taiwan. As Trump plans to visit China soon, directly confronting the US now would risk plunging China-US relations back into icy waters, an outcome China has long sought to avoid, while sending Iran weapons could prompt the US to reciprocate in kind regarding Taiwan.

The war does not pose a threat to China

Although the US declared in its 2025 National Security Strategy that it no longer views China as an adversary and has stepped back from its role as the world’s policeman, retreating to the Western Hemisphere in line with the “Donroe Doctrine”, Beijing harbours no illusion that the rivalry has ended or that Washington will go quietly. Consequently, China believes that as long as it poses a threat to Taiwan, a US ally and what Beijing considers a renegade province, the US will prioritise containing its rise over being drawn into another Middle Eastern quagmire.

Hence, despite Trump’s insistence that all options remain on the table, the US is unlikely to fully commit to a war with Iran. The conflict will likely remain confined to air strikes without putting boots on the ground. Given that previous US efforts to induce regime change have succeeded only when supported by US or allied ground troops, as seen in Iraq and Libya, the absence of both infers that while the US may significantly weaken Iran, toppling its government remains unlikely.

While Trump still lacks a realistic endgame, what is becoming increasingly clear is that, amid mounting pressure from US allies and growing domestic dissatisfaction over rising oil prices, the war will likely end soon with Trump himself signalling that he is searching for an off-ramp.

As such, the war is unlikely to pose an existential threat to China’s economy. Even if the conflict continues, as long as it remains under four months, China is well positioned to weather the shock of rising oil prices, cushioned by the vast oil stockpile it had amassed in anticipation of such contingencies.

Even if the US were to topple the Iranian government, China’s position as the world’s largest importer of oil and gas means that any new pro-US government would seek to maintain cordial relations with Beijing. After all, any Iranian government would remain heavily dependent on oil and gas revenue.

In this sense, Iran would come to resemble many other countries, economically reliant on China and militarily dependent on the US. Some Chinese scholars even suggest that lifting US sanctions could paradoxically lead to increased Chinese investment in Iran as investors would no longer have to fear US extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Should China remain idle while that happens, however, it will not only erode its status as a great power but also expose an uncomfortable truth. While Beijing may publicly denounce the idea that “might makes right,” its decision to leave a partner to fend for itself when its own core interests are at stake suggests something more enduring: Might still sets the limits of principle.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.